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Abstract
We study pricing by a monopoly platform that matches buyers and sellers in an envi-
ronment with cross-market externalities. Said platform has no private information, does
not set the commodity's price and can only charge trading parties for the transaction.
Our innovation consists in introducing moral hazard on the sellers' side and an equilib-
rium notion of platform reputation in an in¯nite horizon model. With linear fees the
platform can mitigate, but not eliminate, the loss of reputation induced by moral hazard.
If lump-sum fees (registration fees) can be levied, moral hazard can be overcome. The up-
front payment determines the participation threshold of sellers and extracts them, while
(lower) transactions fees provide incentives for good behavior. This breaks the equivalence
of lump-sum payments and linear fees (Rochet and Tirole (2006)). We draw implications
for the role of subsidies (Caillaud and Jullien (2003)).
JEL Classi¯cation: L11,L12,L14,L81D21,D82.
Keywords: platforms, two-sided markets, reputation, moral hazard.
1 Introduction
Marketplaces, stock exchanges and, more recently, internet-based trading platforms bring to-
gether sellers and buyers of all stripes. Typically it is di±cult to control the behavior of these
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1traders, as they transact not with the platform but directly with each other. A trading site
such as e-Bay, for example, exerts little or no control on the representations made by sellers
to buyers, or on the quality of the items exchanged, the price of which it does not set. Hence
opportunistic behavior can reasonably be expected to arise { and evidently does.1 While the
trading parties are the ones directly injured, this is a problem for the platform as it a®ects the
value of the service it o®ers, and therefore on its ability to extract surplus from traders. That
is, platforms face a problem of reputation, which they can govern only indirectly through the
behavior of the parties they host.
The object of this paper is to study a platform's response to opportunistic behavior when
it has a limited set of instruments. It turns out that prices are an easy and e®ective way of
addressing the issue.2 To capture the problem, we let sellers pick one of a good and a bad
action, which a®ects the buyer's payo® directly. For example, a seller may ship a fake product,
or an advertiser may place a misleading ad, which is a waste of the consumer's time. If the good
action is socially bene¯cial (but privately costly), what can a platform do to induce the sellers
to do the right thing? Speci¯cally, we observe that some platforms (for example, half.com)
charge transaction fees only, while others use both transaction fees and registration fees (such
as Yahoo!Stores or MySpaceMyAds.com), and we o®er a strong rationale for the latter.
The model is one of repeated interactions over an in¯nite horizon. At the heart of the paper
is the following. Buyers can form an \opinion" of the platform, which corresponds to the belief
that a seller they are matched with, will take the good action. This opinion is the reputation of
the intermediary. The platform's prices generate a behavior on the part of sellers, which buyers
anticipate and optimally respond to. Conversely, they also induce a behavior from buyers, that
sellers optimally reply to. In equilibrium these behaviors have to be consistent. This de¯nes the
1For example, a German court ordered e-Bay to take preventive measure to guard against the sale of fake
Rolex watches in April 2008. In June 2008, a Paris tribunal found e-Bay responsible for counterfeits traded on
its site and ordered the site to pay 40 million Euro to LVMH . In contrast, in July 2008, e-Bay was cleared in a
lawsuit brought forth by Ti®any and Co., charging it of facilitating the sales of counterfeit goods. Source: NY
Times, 15 July 2008.
2Other platforms may use a broader set of instruments than we allow for, such as vetting their members,
or policing them, as do securities exchanges such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange (CME). For example, the CME regularly audits its own clearing members for ¯nancial
viability. Furthermore, the NYSE and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) have become a
Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO) though their joint enforcement arm called the Financial Industry Regu-
latory Authority (FINRA). A SRO is able to enact and enforce its own rules, as well as the broader rule of
law, and engages in dispute resolution between parties. The FINRA explicitly o®ers an element of investor
protection. Of course, no Internet trading site quali¯es as a SRO. In fact, as evidenced by their Terms and
Conditions, these intermediaries go to length to point out they do not take any responsibility for the deed,
claims or statements of their customers. These Terms and Conditions may not be always upheld in a legal
challenge.
2equilibrium reputation of the platform. A good reputation is helpful in that the buyers' expected
value of a trade increases with reputation. We assume that as a punishment, the platform may
exclude sellers taking the bad action if they are detected, which occurs with some probability.
Hence a cheating seller runs the risk of foregoing future trades. This speci¯c punishment may
be extreme, and in some cases may even not be the optimal punishment, but it is quite a natural
one.3 Most trading platforms reserve the right to exclude participants if they are harmful to
others, as for example e-Bay, MySpace, Yahoo!Stores, Match.com, GumTree.com.au, or even
the more laissez-faire craigslist.com.4
Our main result states that with up-front payments (to join the platform, say) and linear
fees, the moral hazard problem can be entirely overcome. That is, the platform can implement
an equilibrium where all sellers choose the good action. This fully replicates (i.e., both in
terms of volume of trade and pro¯ts) the optimal outcome in the absence of moral hazard,
when that outcome involves all sellers choosing the good action. Some papers in the literature
(Armstrong (2006), Rochet and Tirole (2006)) have established the equivalence of lump-sum
fees and transaction fees, absent moral hazard. We show the superiority of the combination
of lump-sum and transaction fees { a two-part tari®. Introducing lump sum fees is essential
when confronting moral hazard. Facing these, sellers must trade o® the upfront payment with
the present value of future trade opportunities when making their participation decision. That
is, each element of the two-part tari® ful¯lls a di®erent role: the lump-sum payment is used
for surplus extraction { it addresses the participation decision, while the transaction fee solves
the incentive problem, given the lump sum. More precisely, transactions fees enter both the
incentive constraint and the participation decision, while the registration fee remains neutral on
incentives. With appropriate payments, the critical value de¯ning the measure of participating
and non-cheating sellers can be made to exactly coincide, hence no seller takes the bad action
in equilibrium. Of course, the marginal seller is completely extracted. In terms of policy, we
attract attention to the facts that (i) registration and transaction fees are no longer equivalent,
unlike in Rochet and Tirole (2006) and Armstrong (2006); and (ii) subsidies need to be carefully
targeted: subsidizing registrations, in this model, is damaging { in contrast to Caillaud and
Jullien (2003).5 Subsidies are not necessary to attract buyers and they would worsen the sellers'
incentive problem. This latter implication is an obvious consequence of moral hazard.
Two-part tari®s are typically used in adverse selection problems as a simple mechanism
3So it may not be necessary, but it is certainly su±cient for our purposes.
4As in the respective Terms and Conditions of these websites.
5Conversely, sellers are essentially subsidized on transaction fee.
3to extract surplus without calling on the more involving optimal contract.6 Similarly, a com-
pensation structure made up of a wage and an output-contingent bonus also implements the
optimal contract in some moral hazard problems. Still, our tari® structure, to paraphrase Ro-
chet and Tirole (2003), is not a reiteration of a standard two-part tari®, for outcomes cannot
be contracted on (by assumption). Instead it falls closer to the class of self-enforcing implicit
contracts in that it is devoid of explicit agreement and addresses a tension of intertemporal
nature. This work also contributes to a broader understanding of moral hazard in the following
sense. While the ¯rst-best can always be achieved in a standard principal-agent model with
appropriate transfers when output is deterministic (as here), in our model the participation of
buyers depends on the action of sellers and the incentives of sellers depends on the participation
of buyers. That is, whether a seller can be induced to take the good action depends not just
on his transfers, but also on those put forth on the buyers' side.
The next section reviews the relevant literature. We then lay out the model in part 3.
Section 4 analyzes the moral hazard problem with linear fees only. In part 5 we consider
up-front payments and o®er a discussion. An example is presented in Section 6. Lastly we
conclude. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Literature
This paper lies as the crossroad of the newly developed literature on two-sided markets, and
some anterior work on the role of intermediaries. Early on, the two-sided market literature
(Rochet and Tirole, 2003 and 2006), Armstrong (2006), Caillaud and Jullien (2003) studied,
respectively, the optimal pricing rule of a monopolist under di®erent governance models, on
showing the equivalence of up-front fees and linear prices, and on analyzing competition between
platforms. Caillaud and Jullien (2003) introduce the notion of \divide-and-conquer strategies",
consisting of subsidizing one side and extracting the surplus from the other one. Subsequent
papers, such as Hagiu (2006 and 2007), build on this work to investigate other questions.
Altering the timing of the game (Hagiu 2006) relaxes the coordination problem but raises the
question of commitment to prices. Hagiu (2007) opens up the important question of whether
an intermediary should choose to operate as a two-sided platform, or as a merchant.7 Rochet
and Tirole's (2003) work suggests that prices on either side may be skewed in one direction,
6See for example La®ont and Tirole (1986), who show that a±ne contracts can approximate the optimal
non-linear schedule.
7A merchant takes control of the goods, sets prices and does not faces the problem of indirect externalities.
4depending on the \quasi-demand" elasticity on each side. Bolt and Tieman (2008) show this
skewness can be so extreme as to set the price at the lower bound of the agents' valuation on one
side, and impose a huge mark-up on the other. They draw implications for antitrust analysis:
high mark-up may not be necessarily socially bad, nor evidence of a lack of competition. In
our case, a high mark-up on the buyers' side is essential to provide incentives on the sellers'
side, and consistent with higher welfare. Wright (2004) also highlights the pitfalls of thinking
as if the market were one-sided when in fact one faces a two-sided structure. Biglaiser (1993)
and Biglaiser and Ma (1992) investigate the role of intermediaries. Their approach endows said
intermediary with a superior technology (either innate or acquired at a cost) to inspect goods of
varying quality, which provide him with private information. The intermediary is long-lived and
therefore wants to build a reputation for reliability. In contrast, our platform does not inspect
commodities, nor does it take ownership. Therefore it does not set prices for the commodities,
nor does it hold information it could signal. Instead, its monitoring technology informs it ex
post and it can only alter the fees it charges its users. Yet it is able to play a socially bene¯cial
role, not only by matching agents but also by promoting the socially desirable action. It does
so because, as in Biglaiser (1993) for example, it builds a good reputation, which is necessary
to overcome a market failure induced by asymmetric information.
3 The Model
Our model is based on that of Rochet and Tirole (2003). It departs from the latter by allowing
for moral hazard on the sellers' side and because it is cast in a dynamic (in¯nite horizon)
framework.
Agents and primitives There is a single platform that o®ers intermediation services to a
population of sellers and buyers every period. Sellers and buyers need this intermediation,
as they cannot meet by themselves. Both the population of sellers and that of buyers are
constituted of a continuum of heterogenous agents. Sellers are indexed by s 2 R and buyers
by b 2 R { their respective type. The precise characterization of the populations of sellers and
buyers as well as their dynamics will be made below. Time is discrete and indexed by ¿.
Matching and payo®s Conditional on patronizing the platform, a seller is randomly matched
in each period with a buyer with exogenous probability ¹ > 0. If matched, a seller chooses (i)




s + d if a = l
s if a = h,
where d > 0. Action h is costly to the seller as compared to action l. If matched, a buyer
faces the sole decision of whether to trade. A buyer of type b values a transaction with a seller
taking action a following
u(b;a) =
(
b if a = l
b + y if a = h,
where y > 0. So a buyer always prefers that the seller take action h over the alternative l.
Throughout we impose y > d whence u(b;h) + v(s;h) > u(b;l) + v(s;l) for all s and b: in any
transaction the (high-cost) action h is socially bene¯cial. Agents are risk neutral. Whenever a
buyer and a seller complete a trade, they must pay to the platform transaction fees tb and ts,
respectively, the net payo® per transaction to a seller of type s is v(s;a)¡ts and to a buyer of
type b is u(b;a) ¡ tb. Both buyers and sellers get zero when they do not trade.
Information Each side of the market is uninformed as to the other's type upon transacting.
In particular, the buyer does not observe the type of the seller, whose choice of action a
may depend on his type. Moreover, the buyer does not observe the seller's action before the
transaction is completed. Without this information, the buyer's valuation of a trade depends
on his expectation as to the seller's action. Thus, reputation, which is the buyer's perceived
probability that the seller will choose action h, plays an important role in the buyer's decision
to trade. The platform does not observe sellers and buyers' types either. However, it does
have a(n) (imperfect) monitoring technology that provides it with ex post information about
sellers' actions. Speci¯cally, whenever a seller chooses action l, the platform observes it with
probability ® < 1. The platform never receives a wrong signal: no signal is received by the
platform if the sellers chooses action h. This signal structure attempts to re°ect imperfections
in buyer feedback to the platform (e.g. disputes may be settled directly) or the platform's policy
of non-systematic arbitration of dispute.8 We assume that sellers' actions are not veri¯able, or
contracting costs are prohibitive compared to the gains from trade. Therefore contracts that
are contingent on the sellers' actions are not feasible. When such contracts are feasible there
is no role for reputation.
8For example, platforms like MySpace and Match.com explicitly state in their \Terms of use Agreement"
that they reserve the right, but have no obligation, to become involved in any way with disputes between
members, and in disputes between members and other users.
6Rewards and punishment Intertemporal incentives are required to induce sellers to choose
the more costly (and more e±cient) action. We consider a natural form of punishment: if
detected, sellers who choose action l are excluded from the platform. That is, they are prevented
from trading through the platform forever after. Almost all trading platforms or other platforms
that o®er intermediation services do reserve the right to exclude members whose behavior they
deem inappropriate. Websites such as e-Bay, Match.com, Yahoo! Stores and Half.com are only
a few examples.9
Sellers and buyers population With probability m a seller leaves the platform (\dies") at
the end of each period ¿. This probability is exogenous, independent of the sellers' behavior
and of his type. Hence in each period sellers may leave the market either because they die
or because they were caught cheating and were excluded from the platform. Every period a
¯xed number (measure) E of new sellers, drawn from a log-concave distribution F(s) with
everywhere positive density f(s), enter the market. With these entry and exit movements of
sellers, the distribution and number (measure) of sellers in the population may vary from one
period to the other. Throughout, we denote the distribution and the measure of sellers in
period ¿ by F¿(s) and S¿, respectively.
Buyers live only one period. Each period, a totally new population of buyers with measure
one is drawn from a log-concave distribution G(b) with everywhere positive density g(b). The
assumption that buyers live only one period simpli¯es considerably the analysis and the expo-
sition, but none of our results depend on it. They all remain valid if, similarly to the case of
sellers, we assume that at a buyer dies with some probability at the end of each period and a
¯xed measure of new buyers enters the market.
In this setup we formalize the idea of equilibrium reputation, establish existence of an equi-
librium, analyze how fees a®ect that reputation, and address the question of optimal fees. This
analysis is performed in a steady-state, which is characterized by a time-invariant distribution
and measure of sellers. Buyers and sellers seek to maximize total discounted utility, while the
platform maximizes total discounted pro¯ts. To do so, each period buyers simply elect whether
to trade if matched; so do sellers, and if trading, which action to take. The platform selects the
fees it charges each party for its intermediation service. The common discount factor is ± < 1.
The sellers' behavior is the essence of our notion of reputation. We de¯ne platform reputation
9For example, Half.com states in its policy and guidelines that: \Sellers are expected to perform in a manner
that results in a consistently high level of buyer satisfaction. If a seller's interactions with the Half.com com-
munity create unacceptable levels of buyer dissatisfaction, that seller has violated the Seller Non-Performance
policy." They also state clearly that a violation of this policy by a seller may result in account suspension.
7as the buyers' expectation (i.e., perceived probability) that a seller who trades on the platform
chooses action h if a transaction occurs. Of course, in equilibrium this expectation must be
consistent with the sellers' behavior. That is, it must be identical to the proportion of sellers
who do take action h, among those who trade on the platform.
4 Linear Fees and their Shortcomings
We start with transaction fees only. This allows us to expose the basic mechanics of the model
in a simpler setting than with a two-part tari®. Also, this demonstrates the limitations of linear
prices under moral hazard, which we will compare to the case where the platform charges both
transaction and registration fees (Section 5). Throughout ts denotes the transaction fee charged
to sellers and tb that to buyers. We begin with the buyers' trading decision given the platform's
reputation and the fee charged to buyers, then turn to the sellers' decision given the behavior
on the buyer side and the fee charged to sellers. Combining these two enables us to derive the
equilibrium reputation and transactions, given the prices charged by the platform.
Buyers' transaction decisions Let r be the platform's reputation, that is, r = Pr(a = h)
when meeting a randomly drawn seller. If matched, a buyer faces the choice of whether to
accept to trade. Conditional on a match and on being of type b, her expected value from the
transaction is ru(b;h)+(1¡r)u(b;l)¡tb = b+ry¡tb. Hence the buyer accepts the transaction
if and only if b + ry ¡ tb ¸ 0. Given this, we can de¯ne
D
b(t
b;r) ´ 1 ¡ G(t
b ¡ ry) (1)
as the proportion of buyers who accept to trade on the platform given the transaction fee tb
and reputation r. We refer to Db(tb;r) as buyer participation. It can be interpreted as the
buyers' demand for transactions. Following the assumptions on G(b); Db(tb;r) is continuous,
decreasing in tb and increasing in r. An immediate consequence of this observation is that
reputation is valuable to the platform. All things otherwise equal, the higher the platform's
reputation, the higher the measure of buyers willing to trade on it.
Sellers' transaction decisions Fix buyer participation. Let it be Xb in any given period.10
If matched, a seller has two decisions to make: whether to accept the trade and which action
10Because we are interested in steady state equilibria where all variables are stationary, it is su±cient to study
sellers' optimal behavior when buyer participation is the same in every period.
8a 2 fl;hg to take. These decisions depend on the seller's payo® from the current transaction,
and on the seller's continuation value of trade. When buyer participation is the same in every
period, the seller's problem is stationary and the seller's continuation value of trade is also the
same in every period. For a seller of type s, let V (s) denote the present value of the expected
future payo®s at the beginning of a period, before he knows whether he will be matched to a
buyer in that period. V (s) corresponds to the value of the platform to a seller of type s and
satis¯es the (Bellman) equation
V (s) = ¹X
b maxf0 + (1 ¡ m)±V (s);s + d ¡ t
s + (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ m)±V (s);s ¡ t
s + (1 ¡ m)±V (s)g
+(1 ¡ ¹X
b)(1 ¡ m)±V (s). (2)
With probability ¹Xb the seller is matched with a buyer who wishes to trade and faces three
options. First, the seller may decide to not trade, in which case he receives 0; he is sure to not
be excluded from the platform in the next period, which is worth V (s). Second, he may decide
to trade and to choose action l, collect s + d ¡ ts, and to remain on the platform only with
probability 1 ¡ ®. Finally, the seller may decide to trade and to select action h, in which case
he receives s ¡ ts and is sure to not be excluded from the platform. In the alternative, with
probability 1 ¡ ¹Xb the seller is not matched with a buyer willing to trade and therefore can
only wait until next period. Throughout a seller dies with probability m. Hence
Lemma 1 When matched with a buyer, a seller of type s accepts to trade if and only if s+d ¸
ts.
Only sellers with a high-enough valuation trade whereas the others do not. Traders includes all
the sellers to whom the net value of a transaction when they choose action l is positive. Given
transaction fee ts, the exact proportion of sellers accepting to trade in period ¿ when matched,




s) ´ 1 ¡ F¿(t
s ¡ d) (3)
denote that proportion. Ds
¿(ts) is referred to as seller participation. It is decreasing in ts. For
expositional convenience, let sl(ts) ´ ts ¡ d. That is, sl(ts) represents the threshold level of s
above which sellers accept to trade given transaction fee ts. Then Ds
¿(ts) = 1 ¡ F¿(sl(ts)).
Consider now a seller's choice between actions l and h { this is the incentive problem. The
seller takes the high-cost and socially bene¯cial action h if and only if the immediate gain
from cheating on the current transaction, d, does not exceed the reduction of his expected
9continuation value of trade if being excluded from the platform. That is, a seller of type s
chooses action h if and only if d · ®(1 ¡ m)±V (s). The optimal action is characterized as
follows.
Lemma 2 When matched with a buyer, a seller of type s who accepts to trade (and expects








When condition (4) holds, V (s) is su±ciently high so that choosing action h is optimal, and
conversely if it fails. We see that sellers' incentives to choose action h when transacting depend
not only on ts but also on the buyers' participation on the platform Xb. These cross-market
e®ects are a central feature of two-sided markets.11 For expositional convenience, let sh(ts;Xb)
denote the value of s, given ts and Xb > 0, such that (4) binds. It represents the threshold
value of s above which sellers choose action h. It satis¯es sh(ts;Xb) > sl(ts) for all ts and
Xb > 0. Then we have, given ts and Xb > 0, for





sellers trade and choose action l; and
² s ¸ sh(ts;Xb) sellers trade and choose action h.
Equilibrium With this preliminary analysis we can turn to equilibrium outcomes. The
proportion of sellers who trade on the platform and the proportion of sellers who trade and
choose action h depends on the distribution of sellers. This distribution may evolve over time
as some sellers leave the market and others, not necessarily identical to them, enter it. In





loss of mass of the distribution F¿ on that fraction of the support. Still we can ¯nd a stationary
distribution of the population of sellers. To this end, let N; L and H denote the proportions
of sellers who do not trade on the platform, trade and choose action l, and trade and choose
action h, respectively.
De¯nition 1 (Equilibrium transactions and reputation) Given transactions fees tb and
ts, a steady-state equilibrium is a tuple hXb¤;N¤;L¤;H¤;S¤;r¤i such that:
11For example, in Caillaud and Jullien (2003), the sellers' decision to register in the platform depends on the
buyers' participation on the platform and vice-versa. Absent registration fees in this model, it is the seller's
incentive to choose the high action in a transaction that depends on the buyer's participation on the platform.
101. (steady state conditions) the number of total sellers and the proportions of those sellers
who do not trade, trade and choose action l, and trade and choose action h remain
constant,i.e.,
(a) EF(sl(ts)) = mN¤S¤
(b) E[F(sh(ts;Xb¤)) ¡ F(sl(ts))] = [m + (1 ¡ m)¹Xb¤®]L¤S¤
(c) E[1 ¡ F(sh(ts;Xb¤))] = mH¤S¤
(d) N¤ + L¤ + H¤ = 1;
2. (buyer participation is consistent with r¤ and tb) Xb¤ = Db(tb;r¤) and
3. (reputation is consistent with seller behavior) r¤ = H¤
L¤+H¤.
Equilibrium transaction volumes and reputation are then characterized by these six conditions.
The ¯rst four are necessary for the proportions N;L and H to be stationary, well de¯ned
and consistent with seller optimal behavior given ts and buyer participation Xb¤; they also
determine the (endogenous) measure of active sellers (S¤). Stationarity follows from conditions
1.(a)-1.(c), which require the number of new sellers entering the market to be identical to the
number of sellers exiting the market, (a) among those sellers who do not trade on the platform,
(b) those who trade and cheat and (c) those who trade and do not cheat. The ¯fth condition
dictates that buyers' transaction decisions be optimal given transaction fee tb and platform
reputation. Last, the sixth condition states that platform reputation be consistent with the
sellers' optimal behavior regarding action a. Thus, in equilibrium, platform reputation has to
be consistent with sellers' optimal behavior; and sellers' optimal behavior has to be optimal
given buyer participation, which in turn depends on reputation. The ¯rst result establishes the
existence of an equilibrium and quali¯es equilibrium reputation under linear prices.
Proposition 1 For each (ts;tb) an equilibrium exists. In any equilibrium r¤ 2 (0;1).
Irrespective of the transaction fees charged by the platform to sellers and buyers, the equilibrium
reputation of the platform is always strictly smaller than one. There is always a positive measure
of sellers who trade on the platform and choose the low action. These are the sellers in the
interval [sl(ts);sh(ts;Xb¤)).
Although no equilibrium in which reputation is equal to one exists, the value of the trans-
action fees does a®ect the equilibrium reputation.12 A higher fee tb for buyers implies that
12In general, one cannot rule out the possibility of multiple equilibria. In what follows, we focus on stable
equilibria. We de¯ne stable equilibrium as an equilibrium in which, following a small perturbation in the level
of reputation, a convergence back to the equilibrium occurs.
11fewer of them trade when matched with a seller. This decreases the continuation value V (s),
which withers the punishment. The incentive to choose the more costly action h is therefore
less powerful and in equilibrium, reputation of the platform drops. Altering the sellers fee ts
has a slightly more intricate impact. A higher fee a®ects the sellers' participation { this is
the direct e®ect. But a higher transaction fee also depresses the continuation value V (s), so
fewer sellers choose action h { this is the incentive e®ect. Thus a higher ts implies fewer sellers
with low valuation s (who would choose action l), but more cheating among higher valuation
sellers. Whether increasing ts has a positive or negative e®ect on reputation depends on the
magnitude of each of these two e®ects. In our model, the second e®ect is dominant, implying
that equilibrium reputation decreases with ts.13
Reputational concerns in°uence the platform's choice of ts and tb in the following sense. In
a standard model, transaction fees a®ect the pro¯t per transaction (ts + tb) and the number
of transactions ¹DbDsS. Without moral hazard, volumes respond directly to prices tb and
ts (participation decision). In our model, there is an additional channel: both ts and tb also
a®ect the equilibrium reputation, which in turn modi¯es buyer participation and the number
of total sellers in the population. Optimal transaction fees balance all these e®ects.14 When
the parameter y is high (i.e. buyers are sensitive to reputation), the platform has the incentive
to ensure a high reputation. Using transaction fees only, it faces two limitations. First, as
stated in Proposition 1, the platform is not able to achieve a reputation of one, which may be
optimal (see benchmark case below). Second, to achieve a high reputation, the platform has to
charge low transaction fees, which erodes pro¯ts. In the next section, we consider the option of
charging registration fees in addition to transaction fees and analyze the impact of registration
fees, if any, in mitigating these limitations.
5 Registration and Transaction Fees
As evidenced in the preceding analysis, linear fees are not su±cient to alleviate moral hazard.
Yet we are about to show that only one additional instrument may be su±cient to completely
overcome moral hazard. Let T s and T b denote the registration fees for sellers and for buyers,
respectively. These are paid only once to access the platform. Only registered traders may
use the platform. Before jumping to the main result, we outline a convenient irrelevance result
13For a proof of this result see the Appendix (Lemma 4).
14In Section 6, we consider an example and present the optimal linear fees and the platform's pro¯t associated
with it.
12that speaks to the simplicity of the pricing structure that is used.
5.1 The e®ect of registration fees on the buyer side
We say that two equilibria are outcome equivalent if buyer and seller participation, total number
of sellers, platform reputation and platform pro¯t are identical in both equilibria. Now suppose
that at least one equilibrium exists, which we establish later.
Proposition 2 (Irrelevance of registration fees on the buyer side) For each equilibrium




0i, there exists an outcome equivalent





So using registration fees on the buyer side plays no role on the set of equilibrium outcomes.
Thus, when moral hazard is present on the seller's side only, a platform cannot do any better
by charging a registration fee on the buyers' side. This is at the heart of the Rochet and
Tirole (2006) equivalence result absent moral hazard. As we will see below, transaction and
registration fees on the sellers' side are not equivalent under moral hazard.
Thanks to Proposition 2, we can abstract from the pricing structure on the buyer side
without loss of generality. When buyers do not have to register to trade, the buyers' problem
depends only on transaction fee tb and reputation r. So the decision rules are identical to those
presented in Section 4. Buyer participation is then given by Db(tb;r) as de¯ned by (1).
5.2 Sellers' decisions and equilibrium
Upfront payment may a®ect participation, so we must begin by considering the sellers' problem.
Sellers' registration and transaction decisions For registered sellers, the registration
fee has no direct bearing on their decisions whether to accept a trade and which action to
select. Therefore V (s) is also not a®ected directly in the registration fee T s.15 As before, given
transaction fee ts and buyer participation Xb > 0, if registered, sellers of type (i) s < sl(ts)




trade and choose action l, and (iii) s ¸ sh(ts;Xb) trade
15It may have an in°uence through the equilibrium reputation of the platform, which at this point we take
as given.





0 if s < sl(ts)
¹Xb
1¡±(1¡m)[1¡®¹Xb][s + d ¡ ts] if sl(ts) · s < sh(ts;Xb)
¹Xb
1¡±(1¡m)[s ¡ ts] if sh(ts;Xb) · s.
V (s) is continuous and increasing in s. Naturally a seller of type s registers if and only if
V (s) ¡ T s ¸ 0. Let sR(ts;T s;Xb) denote the value of s such that this latter condition just
binds, when sellers' fees are ts;T s > 0 and buyer's participation is Xb > 0. For expositional
convenience, let sR(ts;0;Xb) = sl(ts). Sellers of type s ¸ sR(ts;T s;Xb) register with the
platform, whereas the others do not. For buyers, the relevant sellers are those who are registered
and trade. Given fees ts and T s and buyers' participation Xb, a seller does so if and only if
s ¸ maxfsl(ts);sR(ts;T s;Xb)g. Hence rede¯ning seller participation as the proportion of sellers











Equilibrium With these lump-sum fees, the sellers' participation decision depends not only
on transaction fees ts,but also on the registration fee T s and on buyers' participation. This
is because participation requires registration, and the value of being registered depends on
the measure of agent's on the other side of the market.16 Accordingly, the de¯nition of an
equilibrium needs to be adjusted. Without loss of generality, hereafter we focus on instances
where T s and T b are non-negative.17
De¯nition 2 (Equilibrium with registration) Given transaction fees tb and ts and regis-
tration fees T s, an equilibrium is a tuple hXb¤;N¤;L¤;H¤;S¤;r¤i such that:
1. (steady state conditions) the number of total sellers and the proportions of those sellers
who do not trade, trade and choose action l, and trade and choose action h remain
constant,i.e.,
(a) EF(sR(ts;T s;Xb¤)) = mN¤S¤
16In contrast to linear fees, where only the seller's incentive problem is directly dependent on the buyers'
participation.
17Note that it is never optimal for the platform to set a negative registration fee Tb or Ts. That would
mean to subsidize registration of buyers or sellers who do not trade, which would not increase buyer or seller
participation and consequently would not increase platform's pro¯t.
14(b) E[F(maxfsR(ts;T s;Xb¤);sh(ts;Xb¤)g)¡F(sR(ts;T s;Xb¤))] = (m+(1¡m)¹Xb¤®)L¤S¤
(c) E[1 ¡ F(maxfsR(ts;T s;Xb¤);sh(ts;Xb¤)g))] = mH¤S¤
(d) N¤ + L¤ + H¤ = 1;
2. (buyer participation and registration is consistent with r¤ and tb) Xb¤ = Db(tb;r¤)
3. (reputation is consistent with seller behavior) r¤ = H¤
L¤+H¤.
The de¯nition remains conceptually the same as before. The main di®erence is that with
registration fees, the de¯nition of equilibrium must re°ect the fact that only those sellers who
register may trade on the platform. Proposition 3 is the counterpart of Proposition 1.
Proposition 3 For each (tb;ts;T s) there exists an equilibrium.
This results departs from Proposition 1 because when agents have to register to trade on the
platform, the equilibrium reputation is not necessarily strictly lower than one. As we will see,
this will turn out to be an important di®erence.
Before continuing with the analysis of registration fees on equilibrium outcomes and plat-
form's pro¯ts, we develop a benchmark against which forthcoming results will be contrasted.
5.3 A benchmark case with no moral hazard
Suppose that the platform can select directly the reputation r it wants, in addition to the
transaction fees (ts;tb) it charges. That is, suppose that the platform observes sellers' types
and for each seller is able to (i) impose the seller's action a in case the seller trades and (ii)
prevent the seller from trading. The only thing the platform cannot do is force sellers to trade.
In this setting there is no moral hazard in the sense that the platform can directly dictate the
action of each seller who trades on it.
Since the sellers who eventually choose action l have the consent of the platform, no exclusion
of sellers occurs. Thus, the relevant steady state distribution of sellers is F and their number
S = E=m: Moreover, since the platforms' pro¯t is increasing in the number of transactions (of
course, provided ts+tb > 0), given a transaction fee ts it is optimal for the platform to allow all
sellers with a valuation s > ts to trade and impose that they choose action h. The platform's
problem is then to choose the number of low action sellers that it will permit to trade. Let
Xs denote the proportion of sellers who trade and r the reputation. Reputation must satisfy




















1 ¡ F(ts ¡ d)
· r · 1.
and claim the following.
Lemma 3 Suppose that F is such that, given d > 0, the ratio [1¡F(x)]=[1¡F(x¡d)] is bounded
away from zero. Then, for y su±ciently large, the solution of the above problem involves r = 1
and transaction fees such that ts + tb = [1 ¡ F(ts)]=f(ts) = [1 ¡ G(tb ¡ y)]=g(tb ¡ y).
The basic trade-o® involves increasing reputation, which buyers value because y is high, at
the expense of the number of sellers, who also pay ts { even if they choose l. But when y is
large enough, the former e®ect dominates and leads to a the corner solution: it is worthwhile
dropping all the low-action sellers.18 Importantly the platform can always achieve strictly
higher pro¯ts when it is able to choose reputation directly { contrary to what was studied in
Section 4. As a preview of forthcoming results, if the platform can replicate this allocation, it
will necessarily increase its pro¯ts. Now we are ready to turn to the analysis of the impact of
registration fees on equilibrium outcomes.
5.4 The main result
We ¯rst note that the equilibrium reputation is increasing in T s. The lump-sum payment
reduces seller participation (those with lower type opt out), while not a®ecting their incentives
with respect to the action a.19 Since the low-type sellers are precisely those with the lower
incentive to choose action h, an increase in registration fees reduces the proportion of cheaters
among sellers who trade, increasing reputation. That is, the registration fee works a as way of
selecting the sellers that trade on the platform. This selection of sellers can be taken to the
18This result is subject to the quali¯cation that F is a distribution for which, given d > 0, the ratio [1 ¡
F(x)]=[1 ¡ F(x ¡ d)] is bounded away from zero. The Logistic and the Extreme are examples of distributions
that satisfy this property.
19For a proof of this result see the Appendix (Lemma 5). As in the case in which the platform can charge
only transaction fees, we cannot rule out the possibility of multiple equilibria. As in that case, we focus here
on stable equilibria.
16extreme, so that only those sellers who choose action h if they trade, register and trade on the
platform. Then we have
Proposition 4 Given transaction fees ts and tb, there exists a registration fee T s such that in
equilibrium the platform's reputation is one.
By choosing su±ciently high registration fees for sellers, the platform can achieve a perfect
reputation; that is, moral hazard can be entirely overcome.20 With transaction fees only, the
equilibrium reputation is always strictly lower than one. This paves the way to our main result.
Proposition 5 Suppose that it is optimal for the platform to implement a reputation of one




generates the same allocation as the optimal allocation in the benchmark case.
That is, the triplet hts
1;T s
1;tb
1i generates the same buyer participation, the same seller partici-
pation and the same pro¯ts as can be achieved in the benchmark case when buyers value action
h su±ciently highly. Registration fees can be so helpful as to implement the optimal allocation
de¯ned in the benchmark case. The reason turns out to be remarkably simple and widely appli-
cable. Linear fees a®ect both the sellers' participation and their incentives (the choice of action
a), while registration fees in°uence the participation decision only. This allows the platform to
appropriately combine transaction and registration fees to provide high incentives for sellers to
choose action h conditional on participation, and simultaneously to keep low-type sellers out
of the platform. With the appropriate mix of fees, the marginal participating seller never take
the low action l, and is made to correspond to the marginal seller absent moral hazard.
This outcome cannot be achieved with transaction fees only for the following reasons. First,
by lowering transaction fees to increase sellers' incentives to choose action h, the platform
induces more low-type sellers to trade. Second, and equally important, registration fees are an
e±cient instrument for the platform to extract surplus from the sellers. To be more speci¯c,
as long as reputation is one, registration fees are as e±cient in surplus extraction from sellers
as transaction fees. They are perfectly substitutable { it is as if there were no moral hazard,
as in Rochet and Tirole (2006).
5.5 Discussion
We have shown that in the presence of moral hazard, transaction and registration fees are no
longer generically interchangeable. Moral hazard voids the equivalence result of Rochet and
20Recall that reputation is one when no seller chooses the low action l.
17Tirole (2006) for the simple reason that transaction fees and registration fees play a di®erent
role. The former enters both the incentive constraint and the participation decision, while the
latter is neutral on incentives. Indeed, Propositions 4 and 5 imply that Proposition 2 does
not have an equivalent on the sellers' side. In the absence of moral hazard of course there is
no incentive constraint to satisfy and these two prices substitute perfectly in the participation
decision.
On another point, we observe that subsidizing registration to induce agents to trade on
the platform worsens the incentive problem by driving a wedge between the participation cut-
o® sl and the incentive threshold sh. As a result, `divide-and-conquer' strategies advocated by
Caillaud and Julien (2003) and Hagiu (2006) (albeit in a model of price competition) need to be
carefully considered under moral hazard and platform reputation is important.21 Subsidizing
the side subject to moral hazard may do more harm than good. Moreover, the lump-sum
payment is precisely used for surplus extraction, while the linear fee is subsidized to provide
incentives.
As mentioned in Footnote 2, there may exist other means to deal with moral hazard, such
as ex post ¯nes, screening of members, legal remedies and so forth. Our mechanism presents
two advantages: (i) it is simple, both conceptually and to implement, and (ii) it is costless
(when the benchmark solution is r¤ = 1). Its one obvious drawback is that some sellers may
be facing a wealth (and credit) constraint that prevents them from participating. It may also
be conceivable to let transaction fees vary with a player's history. But, absent registration
fees, this can never yield a reputation of one because sellers are not committed to a long-term
relationship, so no ex post punishment can be imposed on them. Instead, the ex ante lump-sum
allows the platform to lower transaction fees su±ciently so that all participating sellers take
the high action.
6 An Example
To further illustrate the main result, we present a numerical example where we compute optimal
fees, maximum platform pro¯ts and platform reputation under transaction fees only and when
the platform can charge both transaction and registration fees to buyers and sellers.
Buyers and sellers are drawn from logistic distributions. We ¯x the parameters ±, ¹, ®,
m and d and let y vary. y parametrizes buyers' sensitivity to sellers' action, and therefore to
21DC strategies consist in subsidizing one side to attract it on the platform and extracting surplus from the
other.
18reputation. Thus, by letting y vary, we can analyze the importance of registration fees as buyers
become more sensitive to reputation and consequently reputation becomes more important to
the platform. Table 1, shows the results for several selected values of y.
Tansaction Fees Only Transaction and Registration Fees
Optimal Fees Optimal Fees
y tb ts Reputation Pro¯t tb ts T s Reputation Pro¯t
0.51 0.891 0.627 0.82 19.803 0.896 0.626 0.003 0.82 19.811
1 1.136 0.437 0.853 25.966 1.352 0.054 0.968 1 29.051
1.5 1.452 0.217 0.878 33.947 1.671 -0.099 0.975 1 38.53
2 1.759 0.029 0.899 43.968 2 -0.338 1.329 1 50
2.5 2.132 -0.194 0.917 56.197 2.338 -0.720 2.376 1 63.549
3 2.485 -0.383 0.932 70.684 2.685 -1.208 4.066 1 79.207
Table 1: Optimal fees, pro¯ts and equilibrium reputation when ± = 0:97, ¹ = 1, ® = 0:6, m = 0:1
and d = 0:5. The values in this table are rounded to the third decimal place.
The di®erence between the optimal pro¯t under the two regimes increases with y. The more
sensitive buyers are to reputation, the more essential are the registration fees. Note that
reputation increases with y even when the platform charges only transaction fees. In this case,
the platform increases reputation by lowering those fees (on at least one side of the market).
In this speci¯c case, the platform reduces the sellers' fees, so it reduces surplus extractions.
The example con¯rms that platform may ¯nd it optimal to guarantee a reputation of one for
some values of y. That is, it ¯nds optimal to choose a price structure that completely discourages
sellers to cheat. Reputation increases faster in y when the platform uses registrations fees; that
is, lump-sum payments allow the platform to achieve higher levels of reputation at a lower cost
in terms of surplus extraction. Along the same vein, the di®erence between the transaction fees
charged to buyers and the transaction fees charged to sellers increases with y. This means that
reducing the value of the transaction fees charged to sellers is a more e±cient tool to increase
reputation when lump-sum fees are also charged. So it suggest that in the presence of moral
hazard on the seller's side, one should expect prices to be (more) skewed toward the buyer side
(see Bolt and Tieman (2008)).
Finally, still according to Table 1, the transaction fees charged to sellers when the platform
uses registration fees are lower than those when it does not, and conversely for the buyers'
transaction fees. When the platform can charge registration fees to sellers, it needs not use
19transaction fees to extract surplus, and reducing transaction fees improves incentives (increases
reputation). On the buyers' side, one reason to keep fees low absent registration fees, is to
ensure a high reputation. But when the platform can use registration fees, it has a substitute
tool. As a consequence, the platform can increase the transaction fee charged to buyers to
extract more surplus from them.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies simple pricing strategies available to a monopoly platform in the face moral
hazard on one side of the (two-sided) market. It does so by developing a notion of equilibrium
resting on rational expectations on the part of both sides of the market. Compared to a
moral hazard-free environment, if the platform can only use linear prices it can alleviate, but
not overcome, the moral hazard problem with appropriate distortion of its fees. If up-front
payments are possible, the platform uniformly improves the outcome. By charging registration
fees to sellers, it relieves the tension between ensuring a high reputation and extracting surplus.
Registration fees allow the platform to simultaneously extract surplus from sellers and select
higher valuation sellers with lower incentives to cheat. Improving on the moral hazard problem
is important as it increases surplus extraction from both sides. In some cases it can even reach
an outcome in which the moral hazard problem is entirely overcome.
The upfront payment extracts surplus from sellers while the on-going transaction fees are
used to provide them with the appropriate incentives. Thus the equivalence (Rochet and Tirole
(2006), Armonstrong (2006)) of these two forms of payments is broken, as they serve di®erent
purposes in our model. In addition, this result stands in contrast with Caillaud and Jullien
(2003) or Hagiu (2006), where upfront fees are subsidies and transaction fees are used for surplus
extraction.
An obvious extension of the present work is one in which platforms compete. A less evident,
but critical one, consists in introducing a proper price-formation mechanism for the good sold,
which we so far have abstracted from. Indeed, the manner in which trading parties determine
the commodity's price a®ects whether two-sidedness arise. For example, in Caillaud and Jullien
(2003), the intermediary is not a two-sided one without registration fees.
208 Appendix
8.1 Auxiliary Results
Lemma 4 Suppose the platform can charge only transaction fees to buyers and sellers and let
r¤ denote the reputation associated with a stable equilibrium. Then, r¤ is decreasing in both ts
and tb.
Proof. Fix transaction fees tb and ts. Fix also buyer participation Xb > 0. Given these fees
and buyer participation, the proportion of sellers who trade and choose action l (denoted by
L) and the proportion of sellers who trade and choose action h (denoted by H) that satisfy the
steady state conditions of point 1 of De¯nition 1 are such that
H=(L + H) =
[m + (1 ¡ m)¹Xb®]f1 ¡ F[sh(ts;Xb)]g




(For a characterization of the proportions N, L and H that satisfy the steady state conditions of
point 1 of De¯nition 1, see the proof of Proposition 1). Next, de¯ne k(ts;tb;r) ´ e k(ts;Db(tb;r)).
From De¯nition 1, it is clear that r¤ is an equilibrium reputation when fees are ts and tb only
if k(ts;tb;r¤) = r¤. Furthermore, note that k is di®erentiable and that if r¤ is the reputation
associated with a stable equilibrium, then @k(ts;tb;r¤)=@r < 1. Thus, to show that the repu-
tation r¤ associated with a stable equilibrium decreases with ts and with tb, it su±ces to show
that k increases with ts and tb for each r 2 [0;1].
Consider ¯rst the case of tb. Let Num and Den denote the numerator and denominator of
e k as given in (5), respectively. Then,
@k
@tb =
®(1 ¡ m)¹[Den ¡ Num]f[1 ¡ F(sh)](@Db=@tb) ¡ f(sh)Db(@sh=@Xb)(@Db=@tb)g
¡mf(sh)(@sh=@Xb)(@Db=@tb)
Den2
Now note that @Db=@tb = ¡g(tb ¡ ry) < 0, @sh=@Xb = ¡d[1 ¡ (1 ¡ m)±]=(Xb)2 < 0 and
Den ¡ Num = m[F(sh) ¡ F(sl)] > 0, which implies that @k=@tb < 0.
Consider now the case of ts. Note that k = b k £ [m + (1 ¡ m)¹Db®]=[m + (1 ¡ m)¹Db®b k],
where b k = [1¡F(sh)]=[1¡F(sl)]. Since k increases in b k, it su±ces to show that b k is decreasing








21Because F is log-concave, the hazard rate f=(1¡F) is increasing. Therefore, the left-hand-side
of (6) is less than one, and (6) is satis¯ed since @sl=@ts = @sh=@ts = 1.
Lemma 5 Suppose the platform can charge both transaction and registration fees and let r¤
denote the reputation associated with a stable equilibrium. Then, r¤ is strictly increasing in T s
when r¤ < 1.
Proof. This proof follows the same steps of that of Lemma 4. Fix fees tb, ts and T s ¸ 0. Fix
also buyer participation Xb > 0. Given these fees and buyer participation, the proportion of
sellers who trade and choose action l (denoted by L) and the proportion of sellers who trade and
choose action h (denoted by H) that satisfy the steady state conditions of point 1 of De¯nition
2 are such that
H=(L + H) =
[m + (1 ¡ m)¹Xb®][1 ¡ F(maxfsR(ts;T s;Xb);sh(ts;Xb)g)]






Next, de¯ne k(ts;tb;T s;r) ´ e k(ts;T s;Db(tb;r)). From De¯nition 2, it is clear that r¤ is an
equilibrium reputation when fees are ts, tb and T s only if k(ts;tb;T s;r¤) = r¤. Furthermore, note
that k is di®erentiable when k < 1 and that if r¤ < 1 is the reputation associated with a stable
equilibrium, then @k(ts;tb;r¤)=@r < 1. Thus, to show that the reputation r¤ < 1 associated
with a stable equilibrium strictly increases with T s, it su±ces to show that k increases with
T s when k < 1. The fact that k increases with T s when k < 1 follows from direct inspection
of k, taking into account that (i) sR < sh when k < 1 and (ii) @sR=@T s > 0 8T s > 0 and
@sR=@T sjTs=0+ > 0.
8.2 Proofs of the Lemmas and Propositions in the Text
Proof of Lemma 1. First the only if part. Suppose that s + d < ts. This implies that
also s < ts. Since V (s) is non-negative because the seller can always choose not to trade at
any given match, it is clear from direct inspection of each of the seller's payo®s inside the curly
brackets on the right-hand side of (2) that not trading dominates both trading and choosing
action l and trading and choosing action h.
Now the if part. Suppose that s+d ¸ ts. If it is also the case that s ¸ ts, then regardless of
V (s) a matched seller of type s is better o® trading and choosing action h than not trading at
22all{the third term inside the curly brackets in (2) is greater than the ¯rst. So in this case trading
and choosing action h clearly dominates not trading. If instead s < ts, the opposite happens,
i.e., to trade and choose action h is dominated by not to trade at all. As a consequence, (2)
collapses into V (s) = ¹Xb maxf0+±V (s);s+d¡ts +(1¡®)±V (s)g+(1¡¹Xb)±V (s). When
s + d ¡ ts ¸ 0, the solution to this equation is V (s) = ¹Xb[s + d ¡ ts]=[1 ¡ ±(1 ¡ ®¹Xb)]. This
implies that ±V (s) · s + d ¡ ts + (1 ¡ ®)±V (s), meaning that trading and choosing action l is
better than not trading.
Proof of Lemma 2. As a preliminary fact note that the right-hand side of (4) can be written
as ®(1¡m)±V ND(s), where V ND(s) = [1=(1¡(1¡m)±)]¹Xb[s¡ts] corresponds to the present
value of the expected payo®s to a seller of type s who trades on the platform and never cheats.
We now prove the result in the lemma.
First the only if part. We prove the equivalent statement that if condition (4) is not
satis¯ed then the seller's optimal decision when matched is not to choose action h. Suppose
that condition (4) is not satis¯ed. This means that the seller is better o® deviating once and
then, if not excluded from the platform, choosing the high action forever after. Since the
problem is stationary, the seller's optimal decision given a match must be always the same.
Thus (always) choosing action h given a match is not optimal.
Now the if part. Suppose that (4) holds. Since the right-hand side of (4) is given by
®(1¡m)±V ND(s) and by de¯nition V ND(s) · V (s), this implies that d · ®(1¡m)±V ND(s) ·
®(1 ¡ m)±V (s) and therefore taking the low action cannot be optimal to the seller.
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider an arbitrary pair of fees (tb;ts). Fix r 2 [0;1]. Let
Xb = Db(tb;r) so that point 2 of De¯nition 1 is satis¯ed. Let xl = sl(ts) and xh = sh(ts;Xb).
Finally, let
N =
[m + (1 ¡ m)¹Xb®]F(xl)




m + (1 ¡ m)¹Xb®[1 ¡ F(xh) + F(xl)]
(8)
H =
[m + (1 ¡ m)¹Xb®][1 ¡ F(xh)]







(1 ¡ m)¹Xb®[F(xh) ¡ F(xl)]
m(m + (1 ¡ m)¹Xb®)
¾
(10)
Given Xb; xl; and xh, these values of N; L; H, and S constitute the unique solution to




satis¯es all the conditions in De¯nition 1 if in addition r = H=(L + H).
Now, for any r 2 [0;1], let Xb = Db(tb;r), xl = sl(ts), xh = sh(ts;Xb) and N, L, H, and
S be as in (7)-(10). Continuity of: (i) Db(tb;r) in r, (ii) sh(ts;Xb) in Xb and (iii) F, implies
that H=(L + H) is continuous in r. Moreover, since xh > xl, then L > 0, which implies that
0 < H=(L + H) < 1. Since H=(L + H) is continuous in r and 0 < H=(L + H) < 1, it follows
by Brower's Fixed Point Theorem that for some r 2 [0;1], r = H=(L+H). Furthermore, since
0 < H=(L + H) < 1, that value of r 2 (0;1).
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof consists of four steps. In the ¯rst two steps, we
characterize buyers' and sellers' registration and transaction decisions. In the third step, we
adjust De¯nition 1 to incorporate the fact that buyers and sellers must register to trade in the
platform. In the fourth step, we show the irrelevance of buyers' registration fees for equilibrium
outcomes.
Step 1: Buyers' registration and transaction decisions. A buyer registers with the plat-
form if her expected value of trade exceeds the registration fee. Given reputation r, seller
participation Xs > 0, transaction fee tb and total number of sellers S > 0, that expected
value of trade for a buyer of type b is ¹SXs[b + ry ¡ tb]. The product ¹SXs corresponds to
the probability of being matched with a seller who trades, and b + ry ¡ tb corresponds to the
expected payo® from a transaction. Thus, the buyer registers if and only if ¹SXs(b+ry¡tb)¡
T b ¸ 0. Let bR(tb;T b;r;Xs;S) ´ min
©
b 2 R : ¹XsS(b + ry ¡ tb) ¡ T b ¸ 0
ª
. Buyers of type
b ¸ bR(tb;T b;r;Xs;S) register whereas others do not. The up-front payment only in°uences
the registration decision, not whether to trade if matched with a seller. A buyer registers and
trades if and only if b ¸ maxftb ¡ry;bRg. We then rede¯ne buyer participation as the propor-
tion of buyers who register and accept to trade. Hence, when buyer registration is required,
buyer participation is given by Db(tb;T b;r;Xs;S) ´ 1 ¡ G(maxftb ¡ ry;bR(tb;T b;r;Xs;S)g).
Step 2: Sellers' registration and transaction decisions. A seller registers with the platform
if her expected value of trade exceeds the registration fee. That is, if V (s)¡T s ¸ 0. Conditional
on being registered, a seller's decision of whether to trade and of action a is independent of the
registration fee. Speci¯cally, a seller of type s: does not trade if s < sl(ts); trades and chooses
action l if sl(ts) · s < sh(ts;Xb); and trades and chooses action h if s ¸ sh(ts;Xb). This
implies that given ts and Xb > 0, V (s) = 0 8s · sl(ts) and V (s) > 0 and increasing 8s > sl(ts).
Thus, given ts, Xb > 0 and T s > 0, we can de¯ne sR(ts;T s;Xb) as the value of s such that
V (s)¡T s ¸ 0. Sellers of type s ¸ sR(ts;T s;Xb) register with the platform, whereas the others
24do not. For convenience, let sR(ts;T s = 0;Xb) = sl(ts). Note that sR(ts;T s;Xb) > sl(ts)
8T s > 0. As in the case of buyer participation, we rede¯ne seller participation as the measure
of sellers who register and trade.
Step 3: Equilibrium de¯nition with registration fees. Given transaction fees tb and ts and
registration fees T s ¸ 0 and T b ¸ 0, an equilibrium is a tuple hXb¤;N¤;L¤;H¤;S¤;r¤i such that:
(1) the number of total sellers and the proportions of those sellers who do not trade, trade and
cheat, and trade and do not cheat remain constant, i.e., (1.a) EF(maxfsl(ts);sR(ts;T s;Xb¤)g) =
mN¤S¤, (1.b) E[F(maxfsR(ts;T s;Xb¤);sh(ts;Xb¤)g)¡F(maxfsl(ts);sR(ts;T s;Xb¤)g)] = (m+
(1 ¡ m)¹Xb¤®)L¤S¤, (1.c) E[1 ¡ F(maxfsR(ts;T s;Xb¤);sh(ts;Xb¤)g)] = mH¤S¤ and (1.d)
N¤ + L¤ + H¤ = 1; (2) buyer participation is consistent with r¤ and tb and T b, i.e., Xb¤ =
Db(tb;T b;r¤;L¤ + H¤;S¤); and (3) reputation is consistent with seller behavior, i.e., r¤ =
H¤=(L¤ + H¤).
Step 4: Showing that for any equilibrium when T b > 0, there exists an outcome equiv-
alent equilibrium with T b = 0. Suppose that hXb
0;N0;L0;H0;S0;r0i constitutes an equilib-





0 denote seller participation in this equilibrium,
so that Xs
0 = L0 + H0. We next show that hXb
0;N0;L0;H0;S0;r0i is also an equilibrium
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0;S0). Second, note that since T b
0 > 0 and T b
1 = 0, it follows
that tb
0 ¡ r0y < bR(tb
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0;S0) and that tb




0;S0). It follows from





0;S0). From point (2)













0i. Moreover, given Xb
0, it is clear that the values N0, L0, H0, S0, and r0 also
satisfy points 1 and 3 of the de¯nition of equilibrium when transaction fees on the seller side are
ts
0 and T s
0. This completes the proof that hXb
0;N0;L0;H0;S0;r0i also constitutes an equilibrium





It remains to show that the platform's pro¯ts are the same in both equilibria. Denote the




0i by ¼0 and in
25the equilibrium with fees htb
1;0;ts
0;T s






































































This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. Analogous to that of Proposition 1 and therefore omitted.
Proof of Lemma 3. Given y, suppose that ts; tb and r < 1 is a solution to the above
problem. We use three necessary conditions for ts; tb and r < 1 to be an optimum and show
that when y is su±ciently large they can hold simultaneously.





0. Since in a any solution (ts+tb)
1¡F(ts)
r > 0 (otherwise pro¯t would be zero), this implies
that
ry ·
1 ¡ G(tb ¡ ry)
g(tb ¡ ry)
. (11)




1 ¡ G(tb ¡ ry)
g(tb ¡ ry)
. (12)
3. @¦(ts;tb;r)=@ts ¸ 0. That is, a decrease in ts cannot lead to an increase in pro¯ts.
Note that [1 ¡ F(ts)]=[1 ¡ F(ts ¡ d)] increases with ts because of log-concavity of F,
which means that a if ts and r satisfy the constraint of the problem that constraint will
continue to hold of we decrease ts. The condition @¦(ts;tb;r)=@ts ¸ 0 is equivalent to







Since [1 ¡ F(x)]=[1 ¡ F(x ¡ d)] is bounded away from zero, r is also bounded away from
zero. From this and (11) it follows that for y su±ciently high, tb ¡ ry must be su±ciently low
26since (1 ¡ G(x))=g(x) is decreasing in x by log-concavity of G. Combining (11) and (12), we
obtain that ry · ts+tb. This is equivalent to ts+tb¡ry ¸ 0. From this and the fact that for y
high tb ¡ry is su±ciently low, it follows that for y high, ts must be su±ciently high or at least
cannot be too low. Now combining (11), (12) and (13), we obtain that ry · [1 ¡ F(ts)]=f(ts),
which means that for y high, ts must be su±ciently low, since [1 ¡ F(ts)]=f(ts) is decreasing
by log-concavity of F. Thus, for y su±ciently high, one of the above required conditions must
be violated.
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider an arbitrary pair of transaction fees (tb;ts). Let T s be
such that sR(ts;T s;Db(tb;1)) = sh(ts;Db(tb;1)). Denote that value of T s by T s
0. Note that
T s
0 exists, since (i) sR(ts;T s;Xb) is continuous in T s, (ii) sR(ts;0;Xb) = sl(ts) < sh(ts;Xb)
8Xb > 0 and (iii) limTs!+1 sR(ts;T s;Xb) = +1 8Xb > 0. Next, simply note that if fees are
tb; ts and T s
0, then r = 1, Xb = Db(tb;1), N = F(sR(ts;T s;Db(tb;1))), L = 0, H = 1 ¡ N and
S = E=m satisfy all the conditions of De¯nition 2.
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose that the solution to the benchmark case is hts
0;tb
0;r = 1i.
Let s0 denote the corresponding threshold type of seller above which sellers trade. Because
r = 1, only sellers who take the high action trade, which implies that s0 = ts
0. Thus seller
participation is given by Xs
0 = 1 ¡ F(ts
0) and in steady state there are E=m sellers. Buyer
participation is given by Xb
0 = 1 ¡ G(tb
0 ¡ y). The discounted value of the platform's pro¯t





Under moral hazard, this allocation can be implemented as follows. Choose the buyers'
transaction fee tb
1 = tb
0. Choose the sellers' transaction fee such that sellers of type above s0
prefer to choose the high action. Using the no-cheating condition (4), this transaction fee,











0) = s0. Now select the registration fee T s
1 such that only sellers of type
above s0 trade. That is, choose
T
s
1 = V (s0) =
1






in which case only sellers of type above s0 register (and trade). Thus seller participation
Xs
1 = Xs
0. All those who trade choose the high action, which implies a reputation of 1 and a
27total number of sellers of E=m. Since tb
1 = tb
0 buyer participation also equals the benchmark's:
Xb
1 = Xb
0. All that remains to show is that the platform's pro¯t is the same as in the solution
of the benchmark. It consists of the revenues associated with the transaction fees and the















































































































0; the fourth equality
follows by substituting T s
1 by its value as given in (15) and noting that s0 = ts
0.
References
[1] Armstrong, M. (2006) \Competition in two-sided markets", Rand Journal of Economics,
Vol. 37, pp. 668-691.
[2] Biglaiser, G. (1993) \Middlemen as Experts." Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 24, pp.
212-223.
[3] Bolt, W. and Tiemen, A. (2008) \Heavily Skewed Pricing in Two-Sided Markets." Inter-
national Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 1250-1255.
[4] Caillaud, B. and Bruno Jullien (2003) \Chicken & Egg: Competition Among Intermedia-
tion Service Providers." Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 34, pp. 309-328.
[5] Carrillo, J. D. \Corruption in Hierarchies "Annales d'Economie et de Statistique (2000),
Vol. 59, pp. 37-62
28[6] Hagiu, A. (2006) \Pricing and commitment by two-sided platforms."Rand Journal of Eco-
nomics, Vol. 37 (3).
[7] Hagiu, A. (2007) \Merchant or Two-Sided Platform? "Review of Network Economics, Vol.
6(2)
[8] La®ont, J.-J. and D. Martimort. (2002) \The Theory of Incentives."Princeton University
Press.
[9] La®ont, J.-J. and J. Tirole. (1986) \Using cost observation to regulate ¯rms."Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 94, pp. 614-641.
[10] Rochet, J.-C. and Jean Tirole (2002) \Cooperation among competitors: some economics
of payment card associations. "Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 33 (4), pp. 549-570.
[11] Rochet, J.-C. and Jean Tirole (2003) \Platform competition in two-sided markets."Journal
of the European Economic Association, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 990-1029.
[12] Rochet, J.-C. and Jean Tirole (2006) \Two-sided Markets: A Progress Report."Rand
Journal of Economics, Vol. 37 (3), pp. 645-667
[13] Wright, J. (2004) \One-Sided Logic in Two-Sided Markets."Review of Network Economics,
Vol 3, pp. 42-63.
29